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Social cognition concerns the various psychological processes that enable individuals to take advantage
of being part of a social group. Of major importance to social cognition are the various social signals
that enable us to learn about the world. Such signals include facial expressions, such as fear and
disgust, which warn us of danger, and eye gaze direction, which indicate where interesting things can
be found. Such signals are particularly important in infant development. Social referencing, for
example, refers to the phenomenon in which infants refer to their mothers’ facial expressions to
determine whether or not to approach a novel object. We can learn a great deal simply by observing
others. Much of this signalling seems to happen automatically and unconsciously on the part of both
the sender and the receiver. We can learn to fear a stimulus byobserving the response of another, in the
absence of awareness of that stimulus. By contrast, learning by instruction, rather than observation,
does seem to depend upon awareness of the stimulus, since such learning does not generalize to
situations where the stimulus is presented subliminally. Learning by instruction depends upon a meta-
cognitive process through which both the sender and the receiver recognize that signals are intended to
be signals. An example would be the ‘ostensive’ signals that indicate that what follows are intentional
communications. Infants learn more from signals that they recognize to be instructive. I speculate that
it is this ability to recognize and learn from instructions rather than mere observation which permitted
that advanced ability to beneﬁt from cultural learning that seems to be unique to the human race.
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1. WHAT IS SOCIAL COGNITION?
As currently used, the term ‘cognition’ refers to the
many different processes by which creatures under-
stand and make sense of the world. The term does
much the same work as was previously done by the
term ‘information processing’ and is strongly inﬂu-
enced by developments in computing beginning in the
1940s. Perception, attention, memory and action
planning would all be examples of cognitive processes.
All these processes are important in social interactions
and the study of information processing in a social
setting is referred to as social cognition. ‘The goal of
social cognition is to provide mechanistic, process-
oriented explanations of complex social phenomena’
(Winkielman & Schooler in press). In this paper, I want
to consider whether there are aspects of cognition that
are speciﬁcally social and speciﬁcally human.
When we interact with the environment, psycholo-
gists have traditionally started from the input. Signals
arising from the environment impinge upon us.
Sensations are detected by our sense organs such as
the eyes. The sensations (e.g. light of a certain
wavelength) are turned into perceptions (e.g. the colour
of the fruit) on the basis of prior knowledge and current
context. Then, decisions are made about what should
best be done in response to these perceptions (e.g. Is the
fruit ripe? Should I eat it?). Actions are planned
and ﬁnally output is initiated in the form of motor
movements (e.g. grasping the fruit). Within this general
framework of stimulus and response, we can have a
subset of processes concerned with social stimuli
(e.g.readingfacialexpressions),socialdecisions(Should
I trust this person?) and social responses (making
facial expressions)
(a) Mirror systems and social stimuli
There is currently much interest in mirror systems in
the brain. A mirror system is deﬁned as a collection of
brain regions that are active when we do or experience
something ourselves, and also when we observe some-
one else doing the same thing or having the same
experience. The concept originated from the obser-
vation of neurons in the frontal cortex of the monkey,
which respond when the monkey performs a speciﬁc
action (e.g. picking up a peanut) and also when the
monkey observes someone else performing the same
action (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). These neurons
are now known as mirror neurons. In humans, mirror
systems have been identiﬁed for emotion (Singer et al.
2004;Botvinick et al. 2005) and touch (Blakemore et al.
2005) as well as action (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004).
It seems plausible that systems that link actions and
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others are likely to have an important role in social
cognition. We might even deﬁne one class of social
stimuli as those stimuli that activate mirror systems.
However, we also need to consider what value such
stimuli might havein helping us to navigate successfully
through the social world.
2. SOCIAL STIMULI THAT TELL US ABOUT
THE WORLD
(a) Avoiding danger
Physical disgust is an instinctive emotional reaction to
sights and smells which helps us to avoid food
poisoning or infection. The sight of someone with an
expression of disgust is a signal that they are in contact
with something that we should avoid. There is a mirror
system for disgust (Wicker et al. 2003). When we see a
disgusted face, we feel disgusted ourselves and may
automatically take avoiding action before we con-
sciously recognize the expression or discover the
cause of the disgust.
We can tell a similar story for fear for which there is
also evidence of a mirror system (Morris et al. 1996).
The sight of a fearful face is a signal that there is
something for us to be afraid of, and, as with disgust,
elicits fear in the observer. In the case of fearful
expressions, there are several experiments demonstrat-
ing that the presentation of a fearful face elicits
physiological signs of fear in observers, even when
they are not aware of seeing the face (e.g. Whalen et al.
1998). Elizabeth Phelps and her colleagues (Olsson &
Phelps 2004) have shown that people can learn to fear
an object (such as a blue square) simply by watching
someone else being conditioned to fear that object,
because each time the blue square is presented the
person observed receives a painful shock. This learning
by observation occurs even when the conditioned
stimulus (the blue square) is masked and the observer
is unable to report when this stimulus occurs. The most
probable mechanism underlying this subliminal
learning by observation is classical Pavlovian con-
ditioning. We know (Ohman & Mineka 2001) that
someone can be conditioned when the conditioned
stimulus (CS, e.g. a blue square) is presented
subliminally and followed by a shock (the uncondi-
tioned stimulus, US). In the case of subliminal learning
by observation, the unconditioned stimulus is the sight
of the face of the person in pain, since this stimulus
elicits ‘pain’ in the observer.
Disgust and fear are signals emanating from other
peoples’ faces that indicate that there is something in
their immediate environment to be avoided. However,
a face can also supply a signal that the person should be
avoided. When confronted with unknown people, there
is a high level of inter-subject agreement that certain
faces look trustworthy, while others look untrust-
worthy. The presentation of untrustworthy faces elicits
activity in the amygdala, a physiological sign that
avoiding action should be taken. This seems to be an
automatic response, since it occurs whether subjects
are explicitly asked to rate faces for trustworthiness or
are attending to an irrelevant aspect of the faces such
as sex (Winston et al. 2002). Unlike readings of the
facial expression of fear, our reading of the facial
expression of untrustworthiness seems to be an
example of prejudice. While there is considerable
agreement between people as to what an untrustworthy
face looks like, there is no evidence for any validity for
this reading. Presumably our idea about what an
untrustworthy face looks like has been acquired
through culture. Yet, this cue is still processed
automatically, like signals of fear.
(b) Learning which things are nice and which are
nasty: social referencing
Closely related mechanisms can explain the phenom-
enon of social referencing (Feinman et al. 1992).
Learning about the world from other people is
particularly important during infancy when so much
is novel. Confronted with a novel object or situation,
the infant will look at his or her mother. A smile will
cause the infant to approach while a frown will elicit
avoidance. In this way, the infant can learn about a
basic property of things in the world: whether they are
nice or nasty. However, the infant does not learn about
anything or from anyone. Through evolutionary
history, the brain is pre-prepared to learn more rapidly
about threatening stimuli, such as snakes (Mineka &
Ohman 2002). Infant monkeys rapidly learn to fear
snakes by observing fear in a model, but do not learn to
be afraid of a ﬂower by such observation (Cook &
Mineka 1989). Initially, human infants learn about the
world from observing their mothers, rather than
strangers (Zarbatany & Lamb 1985). However, at 14
months, they will learn from a familiarized stranger
(Klinnert et al. 1986) and by 24 months strangers are
used as a source for learning (Walden & Kim 2005).
Like all signals, those used in social referencing are
inherently ambiguous. The default assumption is that
signs offear tell us that an object is nasty and should be
avoided. But, instead of telling us about the object, the
signal could be telling us about the person showing
fear. Perhaps this person has an abnormal attitude to
this object, such as a phobia. Fourteen-month-old
infants do not seem to make this distinction. They
behave as if signals only tell us about the object, not
about the person signalling (Gergely et al. 2007).
However, by the age of 18 months, infants are able to
make this distinction. I shall come back to this problem
of the signal and the signaller in §6.
(c) Finding locations of interest
In order to learn, from his or her mother’s expression,
whether an object is nice or nasty, the infant must know
which object his or her mother is looking at. The infant
can do this by taking into account the eye gaze direction
of his or her mother. We are very accurate at gauging
eye gaze direction (Anstis et al. 1969). Furthermore,
when we see a person with averted gaze, we tend,
automatically, to look at the place at which they are
looking. We expect there to be something of interest at
this location. Bayliss & Tipper (2006) used eye gaze
direction in various faces as cues in a spatial attention
task. Some faces gave valid cues, some neutral and
some invalid cues. There is known to be a strong
validity effect of eye gaze cues (Driver et al. 1999).
Subjects are much slower to identifyobjects that appear
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gaze direction (invalid cue). Bayliss & Tipper found
that this effect occurred even for faces that consistently
looked in the wrong direction. Subjects seemed to be
unaware of these contingencies. However, after testing,
the subjects rated the faces giving invalid spatial cues as
appearing less trustworthy. We see two social processes
here that seem to be largely automatic and uncon-
scious. First, the shift of attention that is caused
by observing someone’s eye gaze direction and, second,
the learning about how helpful people are from
their behaviour.
3. SOCIAL RESPONSES MIRROR
SOCIAL STIMULI
From a stimulus–response perspective, social cognition
is very symmetrical. One person’s stimulus is another
person’s response. This symmetry is most obvious in
the various examples of the mirror system. I observe
your fearful expression (a social stimulus), which
causes me to make a fearful expression (a social
response). Social interactions typically involve chains
of such stimuli and responses. For example, Keltner &
Buswell (1997) consider the case of the expression of
embarrassment. Our protagonist has committed a
social faux pas and his companions express anger. He
responds by expressing embarrassment. His compa-
nions express sorrow as an empathic response to his
discomfort. His appeasement has worked and every
one expresses happiness.
In this example, the facial movements made by the
participants not only express emotions, but they also
have a communicative role. For our protagonist’s
appeasement to work, it is enough that he expresses
the emotion of embarrassment. He does not have to
feel it. Evidence that the expression of emotions has a
strong communicative role comes from the obser-
vation that the presence of others markedly inﬂuences
the magnitude of facial responses (Parkinson 2005).
For example, Bavelas et al. (1986) demonstrated that
an observer shows much greater signs of sympathy (via
motor mimicry) when the person they are watching is
in eye contact with them. The cynic might conclude
that these facial movements do not reﬂect sympathy,
but rather reputation management. The sender wishes
to persuade the observer that he, the sender, is a
sympathetic person. However, this interpretation
requires that the expression of sympathy should
be deliberate and consciously controlled. It is my
feeling, and this opinion must be tested experimen-
tally, that most of these facial movements are
automatic and occur without conscious control. In
§6b, I will consider those special signals that are
deliberately communicative.
(a) Mirroring responses
When we interact with someone we often mirror each
other’s movements and mannerisms, leading to syn-
chronized leg-crossing, nodding and so on. This is
known as the chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh
1999). We are unaware of this mirroring, but, when it
occurs, it creates the feeling that we have good rapport
with each other. This good feeling is not just directed
at our companion, but to the world in general (van
Baaren et al. 2004). We seem to be learning, not so
much that this is a good person, but that the world is a
good place. This unconscious mirroring can be seen as
a consequence of activity in the brain’s mirror system.
Simply observing someone else move activates the
same movements in the observer. Indeed, it is difﬁcult
to make a movement different from the one you
are observing (Kilner et al. 2003). All these effects
that we have mentioned so far are automatic and
unconscious. Neither the sender nor the receiver need
be aware that they are exchanging signals. Indeed, the
rapport associated with the chameleon effect may be
destroyed if we become aware that we are being
imitated (Lakin & Chartrand 2003). Instead, we may
feel we are being mocked.
4. SOCIAL SIGNALS THAT CONVEY
INFORMATION
We can use social signals to help us attain our goals. If
I am looking for a drink at a reception I can use the
density of people in different parts of the room or
the direction of their movements as signals indicating
the probable location of the drinks table. Most of the
time we use such social signals emitted by people (our
conspeciﬁcs). But we can also use such signals from
species other than our own. We train dogs to point at
quarry such as hares and game birds and the Romans
famously used geese to warn them of danger. And it is
not just us. Many species use signals from other species
to help them achieve their goals (Danchin et al. 2004).
The important aspect of these signals is that they are
emitted by agents, rather than objects. It is therefore
important to be able to detect agents.
(a) Detecting agents
We use very simple cues for detecting agents. A basic
distinction is between self-propelled objects and non-
self-propelled objects. An infant perceives causality
when the motion of a non-self-propelled object is
changed by another object. He or she perceives
intention when a self-propelled object changes motion
(Premack 1990). Infants treat self-propelled objects as
agents with goals (Luo & Baillargeon 2005). Another
important sign of agency is contingent behaviour.
Infants will treat an inanimate object as an agent
having communicative abilities and goal-directed
behaviour, if the object interacts contingently with
them or another person (Johnson 2003). Adults also,
even though they know they are observing inanimate
objects, such as triangles moving on a screen, are
irresistibly driven to interpret the movements of these
objects in terms of goals and intentions (Heider &
Simmel 1944). This detection and interpretation of
agents from movements seems to depend upon an
automatic and highly stimulus-driven perceptual
system (Scholl & Tremoulet 2000).
5. BEYOND STIMULUS–RESPONSE
PSYCHOLOGY: GOALS AND ACTIONS
More recently, psychologists have started to think
that the interaction between the person and the
environment should be described the other way
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environment, the starting point is inside me and
concerns my goals. What is currently my most pressing
goal? How can this goal be best achieved given my prior
knowledge and the current context? On the basis of the
answers to these questions, I perform an act upon the
world (engineers call this the input). This act will cause
new signals to strike my senses (engineers call this the
output) and I will learn whether or not the act has
brought me nearer to my goal. The difference between
what I expected and what actually occurred is the error
signal that drives the system and enables me to
approach my goals (Sutton & Barto 1998). Within
this framework also we can deﬁne subsets of processes
with speciﬁcally social functions. In particular, we can
deﬁne social goals. Social goals are shared goals and
therefore involve at least two people. Shared goals are
most obviously involved in joint action, when at least
two people are required to perform a task or when a
task can be performed better by two people than by one
person on his own. Successful joint action beneﬁts from
communication and also from trust. A shared goal is
also implied when one person works for the beneﬁt of
others. However, social goals can also be competitive,
as when one person tries to deceive another.
(a) Alignment in joint action
Various kinds of alignment between the two partici-
pants are essential for the prosecution of shared
actions. We need a shared vocabulary so that we can
communicate and shared goals so that we can engage in
joint activities. Clark (1996) has called this common
ground. This sharing must occur at many levels of
representation. For example, we should share each
other’s perception of the world. The starting point for
sharing the world that we perceive is to align the focus
of our attention. This process is called joint attention
and is typically achieved by pointing at an object. This
leads to the triadic relationship in which two people
focus their attention on the same object. Background
and foreground in their two perceptual worlds are now
aligned. The wish to share attention in this way can be
observed in infants as young as 12 months (Tomasello
et al. 2005). Many aspects of alignment are achieved by
deliberate communication. The infant points at the
object he or she wants. Adults verbally agree on the
joint goal towards which their action is aimed.
However, there are many aspects of alignment that
occur automatically.
(b) Automatic alignment of goals
When we perform a task with someone we develop a
shared representation of the whole task even though
we are only performing part of it. In one paradigm
(Sebanz et al. 2003), a pair of participants performed a
‘go–nogo’ task, sitting along side each other. Even
though no interpersonal coordination was required,
each actor integrated the co-actor’s alternative action
into their own action planning. This resulted in an
action selection conﬂict when a stimulus required a
different action from each actor (e.g. a ‘nogo’ response
from one actor and a ‘go’ response from the other;
Tsai et al. 2006). This effect seems to be automatic.
For this sort of alignment, simple imitation of action
enabled by the mirror system is not sufﬁcient. Having
shared goals does not always mean that we should
mirror each other’s actions (Sebanz et al. 2006). For
example, when two people are carrying a heavy object,
one may walk backwards, while the other walks
forwards. This complementary form of control often
enables a joint action to be more efﬁcient than the same
action performed by a single person (Reed et al. 2006).
Automatic processes during joint action have been
studied most extensively in relation to spoken dialogue
(e.g. Pickering & Garrod 2004). For example, speakers
give largely unconscious eye gaze signals to control
turn-taking in discourse (Hedge et al. 1978). Likewise,
they use interjections like ‘ah’ and ‘um’ to signal,
respectively, forthcoming smaller or larger delays in
speaking so as to avoid premature interruption
(Clark & Fox Tree 2002). Two speakers also become
more similar in their use of syntax. Branigan et al.
(2000) asked pairs of speakers to take turns in
describing pictures to each other. One speaker was a
confederate of the experimenter and produced descrip-
tions that systematically varied in syntactic structure.
This primed a similar syntactic structure in the other
speaker’s subsequent description.
All these signals, which so strongly affect our verbal
interactions, are largely unconscious and their role
often comes as a surprise when revealed by clever
experiments. In the next section, I shall consider the
deliberate use and interpretation of signals.
6. THE INTERPRETATION OF SIGNALS
(a) Learning by observation and learning
by instruction
Most of the cognitive processes I have discussed so far
function without awareness. People show emotional
responses to fearful faces even though they are not
aware of having seen the face (Morris et al. 1999).
People also showemotional responses to untrustworthy
faces evenwhen they are attending to some other aspect
of the face such as sex (Winston et al. 2002). We have
also seen that the automatic imitation that comprises
the chameleon effect only works when the participants
are unaware that they are being imitated (Lakin &
Chartrand 2003). In all these examples, the partici-
pants are unaware that they are sending or receiving
signals. Thus, many social processes can occur without
conscious awareness. There is much less evidence,
however, as to whether certain social processes cannot
occur in the absence of awareness.
The one exception is the study by Olsson & Phelps
(2004) on the learning of fear through instruction. We
have already seen that people can learn associate fear
with an unseen stimulus during classical Pavlovian
conditioning and also by the observation of someone
else being conditioned. People can also learn by
instruction (Phelps et al. 2001), that is, by being
told that the stimulus (e.g. a blue square) will be
followed by a painful shock. However, this learning by
instruction does not generate a response when the
stimulus is unseen. My interpretation of this result is
that, when learning by instruction, we learn that
the blue square is a signal that means that a shock
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this signal when it is processed below the level of
consciousness. Response to the subliminal signal offear
can only be learned through a more primitive process of
long-term association.
(b) Deliberate signalling and knowledge transfer
The same important distinction applies when we
consider the sender of the signals. This is the contrast
between signals that result from involuntary responses
to the object and signals sent with deliberate commu-
nicative intent. For example, a mother might deliber-
ately simulate fear she did not feel in order to keep the
infant away from a dangerous object. However, in most
cases, deliberate signals are not deceptive. When
directed at infants, deliberate signals are usually
intended to teach (Csibra & Gergely 2006). Teaching
is a particular kind of knowledge transfer, i.e. transfer
by instruction. It is distinctly different from knowledge
transfer by observation. A mother can display her
knowledge simply by engaging in some skilled activity.
The infant can learn by observing this activity. Indeed,
this may be the only way in which infant apes acquire
knowledge from their mothers (e.g. Maestripieri et al.
2002). In teaching knowledge transfer by instruction,
the mother explicitly demonstrates her knowledge and
ensures that the infant is in a receptive state for
acquiring this knowledge.
(c) Ostention
A typical teaching scenario is as follows. The mother
ﬁrst establishes eye contact with the infant, the
mother then looks at and points to an object and
the mother names the object. The ﬁrst signal in the
process, the mother looking at the infant, is not just a
means of attracting the infant’s attention, but it is also
an ostensive gesture (Sperber & Wilson 1995). An
ostensive gesture indicates that the signal that follows
will be a deliberate communication about something
of relevance to the receiver, ‘I am about to tell you
something useful’.
Infants show special sensitivity to the ‘ostensive’
cues that signal the teacher’s communicative intention
to manifest new and relevant knowledge about a
referent object. This kind of signalling is what occurs
when learning by instruction is intended. For example,
the rapid learning of the names for things that occurs
during infancy seems to depend upon the infant
recognizing the referential intentions of other people
(Bloom 2002). In other words, an infant remembers a
name when he or she recognizes that the adult is
deliberately naming the object for his or her beneﬁt. An
example of the role of ostensive gestures in teaching
comes from a study where infants learned a novel
action on an object. Infants rapidly learned to turn on a
light by touching a box with their head (Meltzoff 1988)
when demonstration of this action was preceded by eye
contact. But hardly any infants learned to imitate
this action if it was not preceded by eye contact (Kira ´ly
et al. 2004).
Apart from eyecontact, having one’s name called is a
very common ostensive signal. Infants are very sensitive
to their name being called from the age of 4.5 months
(Mandel et al. 1995). Another ostensive signal is the
use of ‘motherese’ when talking to infants. Infants pay
more attention to motherese than to normal adult
speech (Fernald 1985) because they know that
motherese is directed at them.
There is some evidence that this special kind of
learning through instruction may be uniquely human
(Maestripieri et al. 2002). While apes can learn by
observation, there is little evidence for deliberate
instruction of the use and recognition of ostensive
signals that instruction will be forthcoming. Learning
through observation can certainly lead to the spread of
knowledge through a group creating a form of culture,
but this mechanism will be far less efﬁcient than the one
based on deliberate instruction.
(d) What do we learn about the world
from instructions?
An ostensive signal indicates that the signals that follow
are instructions that will revealsomething relevant to us
about the world. But how do we know whether these
signals are valid? It seems that our default assumption is
that these signals will be valid. We know, however, that
signallers may sometimes be mistaken or deliberately
deceptive. Csibra & Gergely (2006) suggest that, at 14
months, infants assume that signals following an
ostensive gesture (i.e. instructions) are always valid.
As a result, they combine the information from
different sources to get a best estimate of what the
referent object is really like. They do not recognize that
different signallers may have different attitudes to the
same object. By 18 months, infants recognize that
different people have different attitudes to the same
object. This is the same age at which infants begin to
show an understanding of pretence (Friedman & Leslie
2007), recognizing that their mother has a special
attitude to a banana, by pretending it is a telephone.
But once we realize that different signallers have
different attitudes to objects, how do we decide which is
the ‘correct’ attitude? However we make this decision,
the mere fact that we have made it brings in all sorts of
interesting social processes. Does the correct attitude
depend upon the context? Are some people privileged
signallers whose instructions are always treated as
valid? In the early stages of infancy, the mother usually
has this privileged status. Is there a standard or normal
attitude to objects from which a few people deviate?
This is why we can refer to some people as phobics
because their attitude to objects (e.g. birds) is non-
standard. Do we deﬁne out-groups as people with
systematically different attitudes to objects from us?
The point I am making here is that, when we acquire
knowledge from signals deliberately intended to
instruct, we are entering the world of a much richer
culture than can be obtained by learning through
observation. It is this ability to deliberately share
knowledge that makes the human mind unique. The
cognitive essence of this ability is to recognize that
certain signals are deliberately emitted and intended to
instruct. This kind of cognition is sometimes called
meta-cognition. It requires that we reﬂect on our own
cognition, in this case the process of expressing and
receiving signals. Meta-cognition is intimately associ-
ated with self-consciousness.
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restricted to vocalizations or gestures. Marks and
arrangements of inanimate objects can also be used as
deliberate signals. In this way, material becomes part of
culture. Perhaps it is this ability to reﬂect upon our own
signals that provided the basis for the extraordinary
achievements of the human race during the last few
thousand years. This development did not depend
upon changes in the basic cognitive apparatus present
in the human brain, but on the knowledge acquired by
others and passed onto us by deliberate instruction.
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